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NOTES
EQUITY REGARDS ADMINISTRATOR OF THIEF AS CONSTRUCTIVE

TRUSTEE UNDER CERTAIN STATES OF FACT.
In a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals of the State
of New York, that court took a very comprehensive view of the
jurisdiction of a court of equity over constructive trustees.
Lightfoot V. Davis, 91 N. E. 582 (1910).
In that case, the action was brought to recover the value of
certain school bonds, aggregating in amount the sum of $4ooo,
alleged to have been converted by the defendant's intestate on
or about March 18, 1875. The facts, as found by the referee,
were briefly as follows: Intestate, who was the father-in-law
of the plaintiff, and who at the time of the larceny was resident in the household of the plaintiff, broke open during plaintiff's absence the bureau drawer in which the plaintiff kept the
bonds in question and purloined them, together with a memo-
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randum stating the numbers and other details of the bonds.
This memorandum, being the only record of the bond numbers,
the plaintiff was unable to stop their payment or to trace them,
although he made every effort so to do. No suspicion attached
to the deceased during his life. Deceased, who was a banker,
and through whom the plaintiff had bought the bonds, offered
to assist the plaintiff to stop payment. The bonds matured
within a few years and the interest, as it accrued, and the principal was collected by the deceased and mixed with his own
estate, so that the plaintiff was not able to trace it into any
specific property of the deceased. Upon the death of the intestate in 1899 there was found among his papers the memorandum aforesaid, and an examination of his books showed
that he had collected the bonds. Upon the discovery of these
facts, the plaintiff brought this suit against the defendant as
administrator with the will annexed. The relief prayed for
was an accounting and paying over of the principal and income,
if it can be traced, and "if it cannot be traced, that he may have
judgment against the defendant as administrator for the sum
of $I6,ooo." The defence was the Statute of Limitations.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in May, 19o9,1
reversed a judgment of the referee in favor of the plaintiff.
The principal case reverses the judgment of the Appellate
Division.
The Court of Appeals rested its decision upon three main
points. The first was that the deceased, being a thief, obtained
no title to the bonds, their proceeds, or income by reason of the
larceny and his subsequent concealment of them. It said, "If
the acquisition of personal property by adverse possession rests
on analogy to the law relating to real property-and I think
that is the ground on which it seems to rest-it is clear that the
possession must be under claim of right, and open, public and
notorious. Where a person obtains possession of property
secretly by common-law larceny, and conceals that possession,
no lapse of time should confer title on the thief. The contrary
doctrine seems to me shocking both in morals and to common
sense. Had the bonds remained in the possession of the defendant's testator, the plaintiff, on discovering that fact, might
have recovered possession of them by legal process." 2
That the adverse possession in order to create a good legal
title in the possessor must be open and notorious, seems open
to no serious doubt. It seems to be the general rule, however,
132 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (App. Div.) 452 (1909).

'Principal case at p. 584.
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that the actual, visible, notorious, hostile, exclusive, continuous
and uninterrupted possession of land for twenty-one years
under a claim of ownership, whether the original entry was
with or without color of right, creates a perfect title sufficient
not only to support a defence, but to support a recovery in
ejectment, 3 unless, of course, color of title is expressly or by
clear implication required by the Statute of Limitation.
In Ege v. Medlar (Pa.)I it is said: "An entry is by color
of title when it is made under a bona fide and not pretended
claim of title existing in another." * * * "It is not to be forgotten that mere color of title is valuable only so far as it indicates the extent of the disseisor's claim; if it fails in this, it fails
altogether." 5
In Missouri it has been held that one taking possession of
land without legal or equitable right thereto is a trespasser, but
his possession, if continued a sufficient length of time, may,
under certain circumstances, ripen into a legal title, although
an equitable right can never be developed out of a wrongful
act because of the long continuance of the wrong.8 But if his
possession of the land was originally in accord with or in subservience to the true title, the burden is upon him to fix the
time at which he began to hold adversely to the true owner.'
Assuming that the acquisition of title to chattels by adverse
possession is governed by the same rules and principles as the
like acquisition of title to land, it is apparent from the foregoing
that the title of the decedent was defective-not necessarily
because it was under no color of title, for by the general rule
that is not necessary to the acquisition of title by adverse possession-but because the possession of the decedent was not
open, visible, and notorious.
The second ground, upon which the Court based its opinion,
deals with the Statute of Limitations. The Court decided (I)
that while the statute may bar the remedy, it does not cancel the
debt; (2) that since the thief had not acquired title by adverse
possession, the title remained in the plaintiff, who is, therefore,
not barred from maintaining legal proceedings to recover possession of it; (3) that, although an action of conversion for the
'Mead v. Leffingwell, 183 Pa. 187 (1876), at p. 191, top, opinion by
Woodward, J. See also cases cited in i Cyc. lo84 (Adverse Possession) foot-note 77. Compare, however, Vorhees v. Incorporated
Bank of Ackley, 127 Iowa 658 (I9O5), at p. 661, top.
'82 Pa. 86 (1876).
"Ege v. Medlar, (supra) at p. 99 (top).
"Smith v. McCorkle, 105 Mo. 135 (1891).
'Hunninwell v. Adams, 153 Mo. 440 (1900).
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actual taking was barred by the statute, plaintiff still has open
to him his equitable remedy against the defendant as constructive trustee, because under the present Code an action in equity
based on fraud, even where the jurisdiction in equity is only
concurrent with that at law, may be brought at any time within
six years afer the discovery of the fraud, and (4) that the fact
that the ultimate relief sought was a money judgment did not
take it out of the statute.
The third ground, and the one on which the Court rested its
power to give a money judgment, may be best expressed in the
exact words of the Court: "In cases like the one before us
there are two distinct elements of fraud. First, the original
larceny; second, the subsequent concealment of the stolen property and of its sale and the receipt of its proceeds. Assuming (but only for the argument) that under the first no bill in
equity -could be maintained, I think the second affords a good
ground for the interposition of equity, and, as already stated,
that though the plaintiff failed to identify in the estate of the
deceased the proceeds of his bonds, he was still entitled to
what would be a personal judgment were the original wrongdoer still living; for in equity it is the general rule that the
relief to be administered will be adapted to the exigencies of the
case as they exist at the close of the trial." 8
It should be noted that there was no fiduciary relation existing between the deceased and plaintiff at the time of the larceny of the bonds, and that none arose thereafter, unless a constructive trust arose in favor of plaintiff by reason of the decedent's act in stealing the bonds and converting their income,
as well as their proceeds, to his own use. The general rule
seems to be that equity will only take jurisdiction to decree the
return of property, wrongfully in the possession of another, to
the true owner when the property so held is of peculiar value
and not readily duplicable on the market. It may also be
regarded as settled that while a court of equity will not interfere to restrain a crime where there is an adequate remedy at
law-unless possibly in the exceptional case of a threatened
breach of the peace, where the public officials charged with the
duty of preventing the same are either powerless to do their
duty or refuse to do it. If, however, there is a good ground of
equitable jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is not defeated merely
because the acts sought to be relieved against are also a breach
of the law,
Mr. Pomeroy lays down the rule that when instruments have
'Principal case, at p. 586 (col. I), at bottom.
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been fraudulently suppressed or destroyed for the purpose of
hindering or defeating the rights of others, equity has jurisdiction to give appropriate relief by establishing the estate or rights
of the defrauded party.'
A careful perusal of the opinion will convince the reader that
the Court was especially desirous not to close up the only practicable avenue for the recovery of long-term securities stolen
in the numerous bank robberies during the last thirty years.
In the words of the Court, "These securities are often, if not
generally, long-time bonds not maturing until after the expiration of the six-year statutory period for bringing action for
conversion." Having this in mind, it is not necessary to assume
that the Court meant to hold that any suppression by a thief of
property stolen by him would render him or his estate liable
in equity. The principal case on its facts extends only to the
case where a written instrument, under seal, and for whose
recovery the remedy at law is not really adequate, has been
I. T. P.
fraudulently suppressed.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

An interesting discussion as to what constitutes "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution is to be found in the recent case of Weems v. United
States.1
The defendant, a duly appointed officer of the Bureau of
Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands, was convicted of falsifying a
public and official document, by fraudulently entering as paid
"As wages of employes * * * of the United States Government
of the Philippine Islands" of 2o4 pesos on one occasion, and
408 pesos on another occasion. The following sentence was
imposed upon him: "To the penalty of fifteen years of cadena,
together with the accessories of Section 56 of the Penal Code,
and to pay a fine of 40oo pesetas, but not to serve imprisonment
as a subsidiary punishment in case of his insolvency, on account
of the nature of the main penalty, and to pay the costs of this
cause."
It was contended that the "punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment was a cruel and unusual punishment," infringing
the Bill of Rights of the Islands, and entirely disproportionate
to the offense for which the defendant was convicted.
'2 Pom. Eq. Jur., 3rd ed., p. 1654, section 919.
'3o

U. S. Supreme Court Reporter, 544.
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By referring to the Philippine Code, we find that there are
only two degrees of punishment higher in scale than cadena
temporal-death, and cadena perpetua. The punishment of
cadena temporal is from twelve years and one day to twenty
years,' which shall be served in certain penal institutions. And
it is provided that "those sentenced to cadena temporal and
cadena perpetva shall labor for the benefit of the State. They
shall always carry a -chain at the ankle, hanging from the
wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and
shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution." 3 There are besides certain accessory penalties imposed, which are defined to be (i) civil interdiction (by which
the person is deprived, as long as he suffers it, of the rights of
parental authority, guardianship of Rerson or property, participation in the family council, marital authority, the administration of property, and the right to dispose of his own property
by acts inter vivos) ; 4 (2) perpetual absolute disqualification
(which is defined as the deprivation of office, even though it be
held by popular election, the deprivation of the right to vote, or
to be elected to public office, the disqualification to acquire
honors, etc., and the loss of retirement pay); (3) subjection
to surveillance during life (which imposes the following obligations: i. That of fixing his domicil and giving notice thereof
to the authorities, not being allowed to change it without permission from said authorities in writing. 2. To observe the
rules of inspection prescribed. 3.To adopt some trade, art, industry, or profession, should he be without means of his own.
The Court (McKenna, I.,) in an exhaustive opinion on the
provision against "cruel and unusual punishment" as incorporated in the Constitution, its history from the time of the
Stuarts when a clause prohibiting it was incorporated in the
Bill of Rights framed at the revolution of 1688, its adoption by
the Constitutional Convention, and its application to cases arising in the United States since that time, concludes that the punishment in this case was "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Islands and of the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, on the ground that the
inhibition was directed not only against punishments which inflict torture, but also (quoting Field, J., in O'Neill v. Vermont,
144 U. S.323, where the question was raised, but not decided)
"against all punishments which, by their excessive length or
'Arts. 28 and 96.
'Arts. 1o5 and IO6.
'Art. 42.
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severity, are greatly disproportionate to the offenses charged.
* * * The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive
in the bail required or fine imposed or punishment inflicted."
There was a strong dissenting opinion by White, J., with
Holmes, J., concurring, on the ground that "The duty of defining and punishing crime has never, in any civilized country,
been exerted upon mere abstract consideration of the inherent
nature of the crime punished, but has always involved the most
practical considerations of the tendency at a particular time to
commit certain crimes, and of the difficulty of repressing the
same, and of how far it is necessary to impose stem remedies to
prevent the commission of such crimes," and further, that the
term "cruel and unusual punishment" involves only such as
"inflict torture or a lingering death. * * * It implies something inhuman and barbarous."
As to what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" must
remain a matter of debate. The law writers are very indefinite.
Story in his work on the Constitutions 5 says that the provision
"is an exact transcript of a clause in the Bill of Rights framed
at the Revolution of 1688." He expresses the view that "the
provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any government should
authorize or justify such atrocious conduct." Cooley in his
"Constitutional Limitations," hesitates to advance definite
views, and expresses the "difficulty of determining precisely
what is meant by cruel and unusual punishment ;" but says that
it is probable that "any punishment declared by statute for an
offense which was punishable in the same way as at common
law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in a constitutional
sense;" and further that "probably any new statutory offense
may be punished to the same extent and in the mode permitted
by the common law for offenses of a similar nature. Different views of the provision are taken by the State Courts. In
State v. Driver8 a sentence of the defendant for assault and
battery upon his wife was imprisonment in the county jail for
five years, and at the expiration thereof to give security to keep
the peace for five, in the sum of $500 with sureties, which was
held to be cruel and unusual. In Hobbs v. State7 the Court
expressed the opinion that the provisions did not apply to punishment by "fine or imprisonment or both, but such as that inflicted at the whipping post, in the pillory, burning at the stake,
5

Vol.

2,

5th Ed. §i9o3.

'78 N. C. 423.
T133 Ind. 404.
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breaking on the wheel, etc. In Com. v. Wyatt 8 the whipping
post was justified, the Court holding that it was "odious, but not
unusual." Whipping was also sustained in Foote v. State 0 as
a punishment for wife beating. Cooley, in his "Constitutional
Limitations", 10 says that it may well be doubted if the right exist
"to establish the whipping post and the pillory in States where
they were never recognized as instruments of punishment." In
Territory v. Ketchanm, 1 a statute was sustained which imposed
the penalty of death upon any person who should make an assault
upon a railroad train, car, or locomotive for the purpose and
felony.
with the intent to commit murder, robbery, or other
The courts have held that neither shooting to death,12 nor elctrocution,13 as modes of inflicting the death penalty after trial,
conviction, and sentence in a court of proper jurisdiction, nor
a fine of fifty dollars and three months imprisonment at hard
labor for selling liquor in violation of law, 14 nor ten years' imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud, nor the infliction upon
one person of a heavier punishment than that inflicted upon
another prisoner for an identical offense 15 can be regarded as
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In view of the various applications of the provisions against
"cruel and unusual punishment" by the different courts, and
the hesitancy on the part of learned commentators to express
definite views on the subject, it must still be considered a fruitful question for argumentation. Perhaps the view of Mr. Justice White that the question should be governed by local considerations, the tendency to commit certain crimes and the difficulty of repressing them, and the expediency of the particular
remedy invoked, is more in accordance with public policy and
the true intent of the framers of the Constitution.
G.H.B.
6 Rand. (Va.) 694.
'59 Md. 264 (1882).
le 7th Ed., p. 472.
1 ON. M. 718.
I Wilkerson v. Utah, 9g U. S. i3o.
"In re Krennuler, 136 U. S. 436.
"Pervear v. Corn., 5 Wall. 475.
"Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126.
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LIABILITY OF CONTRACTOR TO THIRD PERSONS FOR NEGLIGENCE.

A manufacturer who furnishes a defective article, or a contractor who erects an unsafe structure, as a general rule, is
liable in tort only to his immediate vendee, or contracting party,
for injuries received as a result of such defects.1 To this rule
there are two exceptions: I. Where the article is imminently
dangerous to human life, such as a drug, chemical or explosive.
2. Where the defect is known to, and concealed by, the manufacturer or contractor. The case of O'Brien v. American
Bridge Co.,2 recently decided in Minnesota, while apparently
brought within the second exception, in reality goes a step
further.
In this case the defendant, under contract, constructed a
bridge, which was accepted by the authorities with whom the
contract was made. Owing to the negligence of the defendant,
the bridge was unsafe, and the plaintiff was injured while crossing it. It was held that the plaintiff could recover, on the
ground that the defendant, if not actually aware of the defective condition, was chargeable with knowledge thereof-it
"presumably knew."
At common law one who engaged in a business or profession
assumed a duty to exercise it competently." As shown by the
general rule above, the tendency of the courts has been to restrict this duty and confine it to the parties with whom a contract has been made in the course of the business. Two reasons are given for this: I. The manufacturer cannot reasonably
foresee injury to other than his immediate vendee; the vendee
is a conscious intervening agency. 4 2. Public policy demands
such a limitation." Neither of these reasons appears sound.
Where a defect is latent and the manufacturer sells to a retail
dealer, as is usually the case, the natural and only reasonable
expectation is a sale to a third person, and under such circumstances the dealer certainly is not a conscious agency, diverting
the normal course of events. And while it may be public policy
to encourage and stimulate trade, it would not retard trade to
insist that reasonable care be used by those who gain profit from
it. Indeed, in view of the reasons given for the general rule,
' Huset v. Case Co., 12o Fed. 865; Lewis v. Terry, iii Cal. 39; Heiser
v Kingsaand Co., 1io Mo. 6o5; Curtin v. Somerset, 14o Pa. 70.
2 125 N. W. 1012.
sEverard v. Hopkins, 2 Bulst. 332; Pippin v. Shepard, ii Price 411;
George v. Skivington, L. R. 5. Ex. 1:
'Huset v. Case Co., i2o Fed. 865.
'Huset v. Case Co., 120 Fed. 865; Curtin v. Somerset, 14o Pa. 70.
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the first exception hardly seems logical. There is no reason why
the manufacturer and vendor of a defective drug should foresee injury to a stranger any more than should the manufacturer
of a defective article not a drug. A sound criticism is made in
a recent text-book: "Why liability should, as towards strangers
to the contract, be limited to cases in which the negligent act is
likely to cause death, and not be extended to cases in which it
is likely to cause injury of other kinds, it is difficult to see. The
fact that one kind of article is likely to produce damage of a less
degree than another may be a good reason for requiring a less
degree of care to be taken, but seems to afford no reason for
limiting the class of persons towards whom the duty to take that
care is owed." 0 Furthermore, an unsafe threshing machine
may be as dangerous to life as a carelessly-made drug. The
real reason for the early decisions from which the exception
has developed appears to be the common law rule that every
artificer must exercise care in his trade. 7 And if this rule were
followed logically, a manufacturer would be liable in all cases
where his negligence in construction caused the injury.
The second exception is founded upon the idea that the manufacturer should not be allowed immunity when he has practically committed a fraud. Where he knows of the defect in the
article and conceals it, his act in selling such an article so
nearly amounts to a fraud that he is held responsible to all who
are injured while using the article in the due course of business.8 The only point of conflict here seems to be the proof of
knowledge required. Must actual knowledge on the part of the
manufacturer be shown, or is it sufficient that he should be
charged with knowledge? The latter view was adopted in the
principal case, and a few decisions seem to support it,9 but the
great weight of authority is contra, holding that actual knowledge is necessary.1 0 This latter view is more consistent with
the idea that fraud is really the basis of the liability; the plaintiff must make out his case by showing affirmatively the knowledge on the part of the defendant. The principal case goes
further and does not require such affirmative proof, and it
'Clark and Lindsell on Torts (Can. Ed.), p. 470.
' See Mr. Bohlen's Article on "Affirmative Obligations in the Law
of Tort," 53 Am. Law Reg., p. 361.
'Kuelling v. Lean Co., x83 N. Y. 78; Huset v. Case Co., i2o Fed. 865.
'Pierce v. Thresher Co., 153 Mich. 323; see dicta in Berger v.
Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. I55.
"'Lebourdais v. Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341; Elkins v. McKean, 79
Pa. 493; Heizer v. Kingsland Co., io Mo, 605; Huset v. Case Co.,
12o Fed. 865; Kuelling v. Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N. Y. 78
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would seem to follow from it that a grossly negligent manufacturer, who sells an article with a latent defect in it, would
always be liable to a stranger who has been injured while using
the article in the due course of business, because in such case

the manufacturer would be charged with knowledge of the
defect. The case of Devlin v. Smith 11 on its facts seems to support such liability. In that case the defendant, a scaffold-maker,
negligently constructed a scaffold for a painter, and an employee
of the latter was injured while using the scaffold. Though it
was not proved that the defect was known to and concealed by
the contractor, he was held liable to the employee. It is dif-

ficult to see why such a liability is not sound and just, both from
the standpoint of causal connection and from the fact of public
policy, and it is submitted that in the principal case the defendant was rightly held liable.
In Pennsylvania it seems that no recovery is allowed unless
by
the defective condition is actually known to and concealed
the manufacturer. The element of fraud is necessary 2

The liability in tort of a negligent contractor is the same as
that of a manufacturer, and the acceptance of the completed
work should have no effect upon such liability. However, in
2
under facts similar to the principal case,
Smith v. Railroad,"
recovery was denied, and the court said that the railroad in
erecting the bridge "incurred no obligation except its contract
obligation to the borough. This obligation was fully discharged
as to the construction by the acceptance of the bridge by the
borough council."

Also in Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 4 a con-

tractor who erected an unsafe bridge was held not liable to a
stranger to the contract who was injured while crossing the
bridge. Jaggard, J., in the principal case, distinguishes these
decisions on the ground that in neither was there proof of
knowledge of the defect by the contractor. Whether or not they
should have been charged with knowledge was evidently not
considered pertinent by the courts which rendered the decisions.
These cases might well have been decided contra, and the
principal case justified on another ground-that the contractor
by his want of care had constructed what amounted to a3 public
nuisance. Thus Baron Parke, in Longmeid v. Holliday," says:
"So if a mason contract to erect a bridge or other work in a
- 89 N. Y. 470.
IElkins v. McKean, 79 Pa. 343; Curtin v. Somerset, i4o Pa. 70.
" 20I Pa. 131.

1446 N. J. Law 19.
'6 Exch. 761.
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public street, which he constructs, but not according to contract, and the defects of which are a nuisance to the highway,
he may be responsible to a third person who is injured by the
defective construction, and he cannot be saved from the con-'
sequences of his illegal act in committing the nuisance on the
highway by showing that he was also guilty of a breach of contract and responsible for it."
When real estate is sold, it seems to be the law that the creator of a nuisance on the land does not relieve himself from
liability by the sale. 16 But when an injury is caused by the
non-performance of a duty which is incident to the ownership
and possession of the land, such as the duty to repair, a transfer of the property transfers the obligation. 17 A latent defect
in a personal chattel which prevents its use for the very purpose
for which it was made, certainly seems more analogous to a
nuisance on land than to the mere breach of a duty incident to
the ownership.
One further situation remains to be considered. If the defective article is placed upon the land of the maker, and injury
results to a third person in the course of business, there is no
question of the liability of the maker. 6 This is merely an application of the rule that the owner of real estate owes a duty to
business invitees to use reasonable care to see that the premises
are in a safe condition.
R.C.H.
" Harper v. Plumer, 3 N. H. 69; Bluent v. Aiken, 15 Wendell 522,
is contra, but this decision is no longer law in its own jurisdiction;
seeTStone v. R. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 573, 593.
" Painerv. Morris Tasker Co., 182 Pa. 82.
" Coughtry v. Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124; Bright v. Barnett, 88 Wis.
299.

